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ABSTRACT 
This study gives an overview of the theoretical foundations, empirical procedures and derived results 
of the literature identifying determinants of land prices. Special attention is given to the effects of 
different government support policies on land prices. Since almost all empirical studies on the 
determination of land prices refer either to the net present value method or the hedonic pricing 
approach as a theoretical basis, a short review of these models is provided. While the two approaches 
have different theoretical bases, their empirical implementation converges. Empirical studies use a 
broad range of variables to explain land values and we systematise those into six categories. In order to 
investigate the influence of different measures of government support on land prices, a meta-
regression analysis is carried out. Our results reveal a significantly higher rate of capitalisation for 
decoupled direct payments and a significantly lower rate of capitalisation for agri-environmental 
payments, as compared to the rest of government support. Furthermore, the results show that taking 
theoretically consistent land rents (returns to land) and including non-agricultural variables like urban 
pressure in the regression implies lower elasticities of capitalisation. In addition, we find a significant 
influence of the land type, the data type and estimation techniques on the capitalisation rate.  
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The Valuation of Agricultural Land and 
the Influence of Government Payments 
Paul Feichtinger and Klaus Salhofer* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 10/December 2011 
1. Introduction 
The question of what determines agricultural land values has occupied economists for more 
than 200 years (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817; von Thünen, 1842) and has been an important 
research topic in agricultural economics throughout the last century (Lloyd, 1920; Bean, 
1938; Scofield, 1957; Klinefelter, 1973; Robison et al., 1985; Shaik et al., 2005). Although, a 
few econometric contributions date as far back as the late 1930s (George, 1941), empirical 
analysis of land value determinants took off in the 1960s (Hedrick, 1962; Herdt & Cochrane, 
1966; Tweeten & Martin, 1966) and continues since then (Traill, 1979; Alston, 1986; 
Weersink et al., 1999; Salois et al., 2011). The overall purpose of this study is to give an 
overview of this empirical literature and its underlying theoretical foundations. Of particular 
interest are the effects of different government support policies on land prices. Although 
empirical work on land rental markets has increased substantially over the past ten years 
(e.g. Lence & Mishra, 2003; Kirwan, 2009; Breustedt & Habermann, 2011), most studies 
investigate the sales market. For this reason the focus of this working paper is placed on the 
agricultural land sales market.  
The paper is structured as follows. Most empirical studies investigating the determinants of 
agricultural land prices either refer to the net present value method (NPV) or the hedonic 
pricing approach as a theoretical basis. Therefore, Chapter 2 will outline both methods and 
how they are related. In empirically explaining land prices and their dynamics, researchers 
have utilised a multitude of different variables. Chapter 3 will review and systematise these 
determinants. A long-discussed question in regard to land prices is the influence of 
agricultural support (Hedrick, 1962). The question of how much government payments will 
be capitalised into land values will be tackled based on an extensive literature review and a 
meta-regression analysis in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarises our results and draws some 
conclusions. 
2. Net Present Value and Hedonic Pricing Approach 
Most studies analysing the determinants of land sales prices either refer to the net present 
value (NPV) method or to the hedonic pricing approach as a basis of their work. Therefore, 
we will review both methods and explain their differences and their similarities.  
According to the NPV model, the maximum price a farmer would be willing to pay for a 
particular piece of agricultural land at time t is equal to the summed and discounted expected 
future stream of earnings from this land. In a very general form, we can write  
ܮ௧ ൌ
ܧ௧ሺܴ௧ାଵሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ
൅ ڮ ൅
ܧ௧ሺܴ௧ା௜ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ … ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ା௜ሻ
൅ ڮ ൅
ܧ௧ሺܴ௧ା௡ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ … ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ା௡ሻ
          ሺ1ሻ 
where ܮ௧ is the NPV or the (maximum) price (a farmer would be willing to pay for a unit of 
land) at the end of time period t, ܧ௧ indicates the expectations at time t and ݎ௧ା௜ the discount 
                                                        
* Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group – Technische Universität Mûnchen (MUT) 
(http://ap.wzw.tum.de/). 
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rate in period t+i applied to returns in period Rt+i. In a situation without government 
intervention, ܴ௧ା௜ can be interpreted as a Ricardian land rent, i.e. the returns to land after the 
costs for all other factors of production, including opportunity costs, have been subtracted 
(Featherstone & Baker, 1988). Equation (1) is general in a sense that we assume different 
land rents and different discount rates for each of the n periods. For simplicity, but without 
any loss of generality, let’s assume that ݎ௧ା௜ ൌ ݎ and ܧ௧ሺܴ௧ା௜ሻ ൌ ܧ௧ሺܴሻ for all ݅ ൌ 1,2, … ݊. 
Hence, the discount rate and returns are constant over all n periods. Given this and defining 
ܾ௜ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻି௜, one derives  
ܮ௧ ൌ ෍ ܾ௜ܧ௧ሺܴሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
          ሺ2ሻ 
Additionally, assuming land is a perpetuity (݊ ൌ ∞) and land rents increase (or decrease) at a 
constant (growth) rate (g) and hence ܴ௧ା௜ ൌ ܴ௧ כ ሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻ௜, one derives  
ܮ௧ ൌ
ܧ௧ܴ௧ାଵ
ݎ െ ݃
ൌ ߚܧ௧ܴ௧ାଵ          ሺ3ሻ 
where ߚ ൌ ଵ
௥ି௚
 , the capitalisation rate of Ricardian land rents into the value of land.  
Besides the Ricardian land rent, which is created by the “original and indestructible powers 
of the soils” (Ricardo, 1817), other returns connected to land may capitalise into land prices. 
This is true to some extent for almost all agricultural support programmes. If land is 
necessary to receive this support, people will take expected future earnings from this support 
into account in their willingness to pay. This has been recognised by agricultural economists 
at least since Hedrick (1962). Different payments may capitalise to the land value to a 
different extent. Following Weersink et al. (1999), this can be incorporated into the NPV 
model in the following way: 
ܮ௧ ൌ ߚܧ௧ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ෍ ߚீ,௝ܧ௝,௧ܩ௝,௧ାଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
          ሺ4ሻ 
where m different types of government support payments Gj capitalise into the land price at a 
rate of ߚீ,௝ ൌ
ଵ
௥ି௚ಸ,ೕ
 . This formulation needs some additional discussion. First, while a 
perpetual stream of land rents seems a reasonable assumption, this is probably not the case 
for the stream of government payments. However, it can be argued that one can account for 
this through a high negative growth rate gG,j. Hence, although government payments are 
assumed as perpetuities in equation (4), they converge to 0 within a few periods if gG,j is close 
to -1. Expectations and growth rates may differ for different payment types implying different 
capitalisation rates βG,j. Second, strictly speaking, Gj should be net returns from government 
payments not including implied (opportunity) costs. This becomes clear for example in the 
case of agri-environmental payments, where in many cases additional production costs arise. 
However, in empirical work these additional costs usually decrease our measure of returns to 
land R in equation (4) rather than Gj. Third, a similar problem exists in the case of policies 
that directly or indirectly influence the agricultural product price (e.g. an intervention price, 
an import quota or tax) by increasing R rather than Gj. Hence, although we can theoretically 
distinguish between returns from land and returns from government policy, this is tricky in 
empirical work. Another important remark in regard to the NPV model is that it basically 
reflects the willingness to pay and therefore the demand side of the price finding process. 
In transferring the theoretical outcome of the NPV model in equation (4) into an empirically 
estimable model, another crucial problem remains. In equation (4) land values are based on 
expectations about the long-run stream of net returns, which are unobservable. These 
problems are discussed in detail by Goodwin et al. (2003). Weersink et al. (1999) show how 
to solve this problem assuming rational expectations and knowledge of future returns and 
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payments. Abstracting from these problems we can transfer equation (4) into the following 
empirical model:  
ܮ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚԢܴ௜ ൅ ෍ ߚԢீ,௝ܩ௝,௜ ൅ ߝ௜
௠
௝ୀଵ
          ሺ5ሻ 
where α is a constant, β’ and β’G,j are parameters reflecting β and βG,j in equation (4), and ε is 
a white noise error term. 
Besides returns to land, other factors may influence the land price not included in the NPV 
model. One example is competing demand for land for non-agricultural use, i.e. urban 
pressure. Another example is the structure of the market, e.g. market power of only a few 
land owners willing to sell. One can account for these other factors in equation (5) by arguing 
that those are shifters to the price function and therefore included in the constant α. Or one 
could rewrite equation (5) to 
ܮ௜ ൌ ෍ ߙ௞ܺ௞,௜
௭
௞ୀଵ
൅ ߚԢܴ௜ ൅ ෍ ߚԢீ,௝ܩ௝,௜ ൅ ߝ௜
௠
௝ୀଵ
          ሺ6ሻ 
where Xk are shift variables with X1 = 1 for all i observations and αk are z parameters to be 
estimated. Equation (6) is similar to equation (3) in Goodwin et al. (2003), who introduce a 
number of different indicators of urban pressure into the NPV model. 
In contrast, the hedonic pricing approach is anchored in consumer theory (Lancaster, 1966), 
and starts from the assumption that the price of a good (in our case, land) can be explained 
by a set of characteristics (e.g. land quality) affecting it (Rosen, 1974). Very generally, and as 
an estimable function, agricultural land price is a function of y factors: 
ܮ௜ ൌ ෍ ߜ௟ܼ௟,௜
௬
௟ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜          ሺ7ሻ 
where ܼ௟ are variables representing characteristics with ܼଵ ൌ 1 for all i observations. If 
explanatory variables Zl include returns from land (or some proxy) R and government 
payments Gj,i, the hedonic pricing approach of equation (7) and the empirical 
implementation of the NPV model of equation (6) converge to the same empirical model, 
although based on different theoretical considerations.  
The NPV model has a theoretical basis, which consistently explains the relationship between 
returns from land and government payments on the one hand and the price of land on the 
other. Transferring the NPV model into an empirically estimable function either lacks 
consistency or involves some strong assumptions. However, in empirical work we cannot find 
any difference between studies referring to the NPV model or the hedonic pricing approach. 
Both usually use linear regression analysis including different explanatory variables, some of 
which represent land rents and government payments. 
3. Explanatory Variables used in Empirical Applications 
In an effort to explain what determines land prices as theoretically discussed in the last 
section, researchers have utilised numerous different variables. One way to structure these 
variables is depicted in Figure 1, where we define two major groups: internal/agricultural 
variables and external variables.  
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Figure 1. Variables in empirical analysis 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration. 
Agricultural variables are further split into two subgroups. The first one is concerned with 
returns from agricultural production. Hence, variables in this category usually represent the 
returns from land R. Since estimates of R are often not available, e.g. because the shadow 
price of labour is not known, proxies like market revenues, net income or the price of the 
output are used in empirical work (Table 1). Beside those variables which try to approximate 
R directly utilising some monetary measure, there are also other non-monetary variables 
which have a clear influence on returns from land like yields or soil quality. As described in 
Chapter 2, beside returns from land, returns from government payments influence land 
prices through capitalisation. As long as government payments are tied to the price of 
agricultural production, as in the case of a price support policy, returns to land from 
production R and from government payments G are hardly separable. While some studies 
use total government payments as an explanatory variable of land prices, other split them 
into different categories (e.g. animal payments and area payments). 
Besides returns to land and government payments, there are other factors that may influence 
land prices. The influence of some of these factors, in particular interest rate, inflation rate 
and property tax, can also be explained within the NPV model. Here we systematise these 
external variables used in the literature into three groups: variables describing the market, 
macroeconomic factors and urban pressure indicators.  
 
Explanation of 
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variables
Agricultural 
production
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payments
External variables
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describing the 
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Macroeconomic 
factors
Urban pressure 
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Table 1. Examples for variables used to explain land values 
Agricultural returns - Monetary variables 
– Market revenues (Carlberg, 2002; Barnard et al., 1997; Folland & Hough, 1991; 
Gardner, 2002; etc.) 
– Returns to land (Goodwin et al., 2005 & 2010; Weerahewa et al., 2008) 
– Net income (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Producer price of wheat (Goodwin & Ortalo-Magné, 1992) 
Agricultural returns – Non-monetary variables 
– Yield (Pyykkönen, 2005; Devadoss & Manchu, 2007; Latruffe et al., 2008) 
– Soil quality (Barnard et al., 1997; Kilian, 2010) 
– Temperature and precipitation (Barnard et al., 1997) 
– Dummy for: 
o Irrigation (Barnard et al., 1997) 
o Presence of intensive crops (Barnard et al., 1997) 
o Special crops (Pyykkönen, 2005)  
– Fraction of cropland (Gardner, 2002) 
– Proximity of a port (Folland & Hough, 1991) 
Government payments 
– Total government payments (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007; Vyn, 2006; Henderson & 
Gloy, 2008; Shaik et al., 2005) 
– One or multiple categories of government support (Goodwin et al., 2003 & 2005; 
Pyykkönen, 2005) 
Variables describing the market 
– Pig density (Duvivier et al., 2005) 
– Manure density (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
– Farm density (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
– Average farm size (Folland & Hough, 1991) 
– Size of the agricultural land market (in the case of Duvivier et al., 2005, e.g. the fraction 
of arable farmland exchanged in a particular district in a particular year) 
– Dummy for a specific region 
Macroeconomic factors 
– Interest rate (Weerahewa et al., 2008; Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Inflation rate (Alston, 1986) 
– Property tax rate (Gardner, 2002; Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Multifactor productivity growth (Gardner, 2002) 
– Debt to asset ratio (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Credit availability (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Unemployment rate (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
Urban pressure indicators 
– Total population (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Population density per square kilometre 
– Population growth (Gardner, 2002) 
– Ratio of population to farm acres (Goodwin et al., 2010) 
– Urbanisation categories (Goodwin et al., 2010 & 2005, defined through proximity to an 
urban centre) 
– Rurality – fraction of the population living on farms (Gardner, 2002) 
– Dummy variables for metropolitan areas (Henderson & Gloy, 2008) 
– Proportion of the labour employed in agriculture (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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4. Government Payments in Empirical Land Price Estimations  
Recently, the discussion of capitalisation of government support into land prices gained 
importance through the increasing share of rented agricultural area in most parts of the 
developed world. Empirical investigation of the capitalisation rate has been applied at least 
since Hedrick (1962). However, comparability across studies is limited for several reasons. 
First, the way agriculture is supported has changed significantly over time in most developed 
countries. While support was executed through market price support and production 
subsidies in former times, different kinds of direct payments are often dominant these days. 
Measuring the capitalisation effect from market price support is difficult since it can’t be fully 
dismantled from the influence of land rents (or some proxy). Second, while older studies 
often use time series, cross sections or panel data are more prominent today. Third, 
estimation techniques have considerably changed over time. Hence, we apply a meta-
regression analysis in order to derive some knowledge about the estimated rates of 
capitalisation of different measures of support and to reveal some structural differences that 
may influence the estimated rate of capitalisation.  
Our basic model is an extension of Stanley & Jarrell (1989), 
ܾ௜௞ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ෍ ߚ௝ܦ௝,௜௞ ൅
௠
௝ୀଵ
෍ ߙ௟ܼ௟,௜௞ ൅ ߝ௜௞ 
௬
௟ୀଵ
   ሺ݅ ൌ 1, 2, . . . , ݊ሻ, ሺ݇ ൌ 1, 2, . . . , ݖሻ          ሺ8ሻ 
where ܾ௜௞ is one of n effects reported in the primary study k, ߚ଴, ߚ௝, and ߙ௟, are parameters to 
be estimated, Dj,ik are dummy variables representing m different categories of government 
support, ܼ௟,௜௞ are y variables measuring relevant characteristics of an empirical study and 
explaining its systematic variation from other results in the literature, and ε௜௞ is an error term 
representing white noise. In our case ܾ௜௞ is the elasticity of land prices with respect to 
government payments. ߚ଴ may be interpreted as the ‘true’ average value of ܾ௜௞ if we do not 
distinguish between different government support policies, i.e. use the default category total 
government payments. However, there are theoretical differences in the capitalisation rate of 
government payments depending on the measure of support. This is derived from the fact 
that different government payments have a different impact on land rents R. For example, 
based on theoretical analysis we would expect that an input subsidy on land implies a larger 
increase in land rents as does a subsidy on outputs of the same amount (Latruffe & Le Mouël, 
2009; Guyomard et al., 2004). Taking this into account, parameters ߚ௝ capture the 
differences of particular support policies to the average situation. Therefore, equation (8) is 
used to test for two different things. First, we try to investigate if we find different support 
categories to reveal significant different capitalisation rates. Second, we try to find out if 
differences in for example estimation techniques, included variables, and differences in 
proxies for land rents lead to a systematic and significant bias in estimated capitalisation 
rates.  
A common problem in meta-regression analysis is the correlation within and between 
primary studies. Uses of the same dataset or several articles from the same author are 
reasons for correlations between primary studies. In many cases more than one estimated 
value is reported per study. Examples for differences in those estimations are the use of 
smaller sub-regions of the total dataset, the application of various estimation methods or 
different levels of aggregation. In the meta-regression analysis at hand the number of 
estimates per article is unbalanced and in several cases more than one estimate is drawn 
from the primary study. Not in all cases did the Z variables account for the differences in 
estimates from the same study. Therefore, Nelson & Kennedy (2009) recommend that some 
means of adjusting for non-independence of estimates from the same study should be 
undertaken. Examples of such means are a single estimate per primary study (study-level 
averages or random selection), panel-data methods, and weighted least squares. Our sample 
consists of a relatively small number of primary studies (k = 26) with a highly unbalanced 
number of observations (1 ≤ i ≤ 40). Therefore, utilising only a single estimate per study 
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would leave us with rather small number of observations, while a panel data approach is 
problematic because the data is so highly unbalanced. Hence, we follow Johnston et al. 
(2006), Koetse et al. (2008) and Mrozek & Taylor (2002) and estimate equation (8) as 
pooled regression, but weight residual εik in the least squares function by ݓ௜௞ ൌ ଵ௡ೖ , where nk 
is the number of observations in study k. Therefore, an article with many reported elasticities 
is given the same weight as an article with very few reported elasticities. That studies with 
many estimates are no more informative than others is an arbitrary assumption and has been 
a point of criticism (Johnston et al., 2006). However, not weighting observations would give 
a very high weight to a very few studies.  
As dependent variable, two different measures of capitalisation are possible. First, a marginal 
capitalisation rate ߚԢீ,௝ ൌ ߲ܮ௜/߲ܩ௝,௜, as derived from a linear function as represented in 
equation (4). Second, a capitalisation elasticity ߤீ,௝ ൌ ሺ߲ܮ௜ܩ௝,௜ሻ/ሺ߲ܩ௝,௜ܮ௜ሻ derived from a log-
linear version of equation (4) or calculated. Since utilising the latter provides us with more 
observations, our dependent variable is the elasticity of land prices with respect to 
government payments. Hence, a value of for example 0.5 indicates that a 1% increase in 
government payments leads to a 0.5% increase in land prices. In those cases where only the 
coefficient was reported, the elasticities have been calculated on the mean level of land prices 
and government payments.  
As summarised in Table 2, 246 estimations from 26 articles have been included in total. 
Estimated elasticities vary from -0.40 to 1.184 with a mean elasticity of 0.271. In 70% of the 
cases the elasticity is a number between 0.061 and 0.455. On average, 22 years have been 
included in the analysis where the mean year of the datasets is 1982 and the mean publishing 
year 2002. Each article is cited an average of 15 times (calculated on the basis of the number 
of citations in www.scholar.google.de). The articles reported on average 19 estimates, with a 
minimum of 1 estimate and a maximum of 40 estimates. A full list of all 26 articles and 
descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3.1  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the included articles 
Mean Maximum Minimum 
Elasticity 0.271 1.184 -0.408 
70% confidence interval of elasticity 0.455 0.061 
Year of data 1982 2007 1944 
Years included 22 69 1 
Publishing year 2002 2010 1982 
Citations of articles 15 83 0 
Estimates per article 19 40 1 
Total number of observations 246 
Number of articles 26 
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
                                                        
1 Table A.1 in the Appendix gives a description of the research design and the main results of a 
selection of work conducted in the field.  
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Table 3. List of articles included in the meta-regression analysis 
Author Article Number  Mean  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Obs. 
Henderson & Gloy, 2008 The Impact of Ethanol Plants on Cropland Values in the Great Plains 1 0.302 0.372 0.270 0.032 8 
Weisensel et al., 1988 Where are Saskatchewan Farmland Prices Headed 2 0.088 0.284 -0.342 0.295 4 
Folland & Hough, 1991 Nuclear Power Plants and the Value of Agricultural Land 3 0.386 0.427 0.355 0.033 6 
Hardie et al., 2001 
The Joint Influence of Agricultural and Nonfarm Factors on Real Estate Values: An 
Application to the Mid-Atlantic Region 4 0.474 0.605 0.405 0.077 5 
Sandrey et al., 1982 
Determinants of Oregon Farmland Values: a Pooled Cross-Sectional, Time Series 
Analysis 5 0.228 0.228 0.228  
1 
Carlberg, 2002 Effects of Ownership Restrictions on Farmland Values in Saskatchewan 6 0.043 0.520 -0.408 0.423 4 
Shaik, 2007 Farm Programs and Land Values in Mountain States: Alternative Panel Estimators 7 0.429 0.608 0.224 0.125 15 
Kilian, 2010 
Die Kapitalisierung von Direktzahlungen in landwirtschaftlichen Pacht- und 
Bodenpreisen - Theoretische und empirische Analyse der Fischler-Reform der 
Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik 
8 0.169 0.472 -0.056 0.272 3 
Goodwin et al., 2010 The Buck Stops Where? The Distribution of Agricultural Subsidies 9 0.041 0.134 0.007 0.042 8 
Taylor & Brester, 2005 Noncash Income Transfers and Agricultural Land Values 10 0.100 0.100 0.100 
 
1 
Weerahewa et al., 2008 The Determinants of Farmland Values in Canada 11 0.060 0.060 0.060 
 
1 
Pyykkönen, 2005 Spatial Analysis of Factors Affecting Finnish Farmland Prices 12 0.412 0.835 0.166 0.256 8 
Shaik et al., 2006 Farm programs and agricultural land values 13 0.281 0.543 0.099 0.119 31 
Goodwin et al., 2003 What's wrong with our models of agricultural land values? 14 0.057 0.130 -0.037 0.064 6 
Goodwin et al., 2005 Landowners' Riches: The Distribution of Agricultural Subsidies 15 0.079 0.233 -0.020 0.094 8 
Shaik et al., 2005 The Evolution of Farm Programs and their contribution to agricultural land values 16 0.256 0.397 -0.040 0.136 14 
Duvivier et al., 2005 
A Panel Data Analysis of the determinants of farmland price: An application to the 
effects of the 1992 CAP Reform in Belgium 
17 0.299 0.469 0.121 0.100 28 
Latruffe et al., 2008 
Capitalisation of the government support in agricultural land prices in the Czech 
Republic 
18 0.205 0.890 0.040 0.296 10 
Devadoss & Manchu, 2007 A comprehensive analysis of farmland value determination: a county-level analysis 19 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 
1 
Weersink et al., 1999 The Effect of Agricultural Policy on Farmland Values 20 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.004 10 
Barnard et al., 1997 
Evidence of Capitalization of Direct Government Payments in to U.S. Cropland 
Values 21 0.265 0.690 0.120 0.180 8 
Shaik et al., 2010 
Did 1933 New Deal Legislation Contribute to Farm Real Estate: Temporal and 
Spatial Analysis 22 0.378 0.875 0.103 0.230 18 
Runge & Halbach, 1990 Export Demand, U.S. Farm Income and Land Prices: 1949 - 1985 23 0.322 1.184 0.051 0.208 40 
Veeman et al., 1993 Price Behaviour of Canadian Farmland 24 0.384 0.470 0.260 0.083 5 
Goodwin & Ortalo-Magné, 1992 The Capitalization of Wheat Subsidies into Agricultural Land Values 25 0.380 0.380 0.380 
 
1 
Vyn, 2006 
Testing for Changes in the Effects of Government Payments on Farmland Values in 
Ontario 26 0.130 0.184 0.075 0.077 2 
Total 
  
0.271 1.184 -0.408 0.200 246 
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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About half of the estimates in the investigated studies use total government payments 
without differentiating between payment categories. Hence, we use this as a base line and 
introduce dummies if government payments are split into different types. The groups are: 
market price support (e.g. loan deficiency payments in the US, intervention price in the EU), 
direct payments (e.g. deficiency payments and crop disaster payments in the US, area and 
animal payments in the EU), decoupled direct payments (e.g. counter cyclical payments, 
production flexibility contract payments and market loss assistance in the US, single farm 
payments in the EU) and agri-environmental payments (e.g. conservation reserve 
programme payments in the US, agri-environmental programmes in the EU). These 
categories are closely related to the OECD PSE classification and the numbers of observations 
in each category are listed in Table 4. As discussed in section 3, a market price support policy 
will increase revenues and rents rather than being directly observable as an own variable of 
government payments. However, market price support was a dominant measure of 
government support over decades and has to be included in this analysis. Hence, we use 
estimates of the elasticity of land prices with respect to market revenues as a proxy for the 
elasticity with respect to market price support.  
Table 4. List of independent variables 
Category Description 
Share 
in % 
Number of 
observations 
Government 
payment 
classification 
based on OECD 
PSE categories 
Market price support 31 76 
Direct payments 17 43 
Decoupled direct payments 4 9 
Agri-environmental payments 2 4 
Total government payments 46 114 
Model variables 
Use of proxies, e.g. cash receipts, yield, etc. 76 188 
Land rent  24 58 
Only agricultural variables considered 27 67 
Inclusion of non-agricultural variables 73 179 
Data variables 
No diversification 74 181 
Only arable plots considered 24 59 
Special forms of plots 2 6 
Any form of aggregation, e.g. county level 86 212 
Farm level data  14 34 
North America 80 197 
Europe 20 49 
Structural 
variables 
Single equation model 57 141 
Multiple equation model 43 105 
Linear function 55 135 
Double log specification 45 111 
Spatial econometrics  13 31 
No application of spatial econometrics 87 215 
Lagged dependent variable used 3 8 
No lag of dependent variables 97 238 
Lagged independent variable used 21 52 
No lag of independent variable 79 194 
Informational 
variables 
Publication 85 209 
Not published 15 37 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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All utilised Z variables are listed in Table 4. We distinguish between four different types: 
model variables, data variables, structural variables and informational variables. Model 
variables account for differences in the explanatory variables included. One important 
difference in models to estimate land values is if in accordance with the NPV model land 
rents are included or some approximation (e.g. market revenues, cash receipts) instead. 
Hence, we introduce a dummy being 1 if land rents are used and 0 if an approximation is 
used. Another dummy variable was introduced when non-agricultural variables (e.g. 
population growth, housing values, etc.) are included in the regression. Data variables 
account for differences in the data set. We account for differences in land types having been 
considered in the study. For this, we choose to include a dummy variable when estimations 
are based on arable land (which is corn, wheat and soybean dominated). In addition, studies 
are either based on US or European data and we use a dummy to account for the two 
different regions. Finally, we include a dummy variable for farm level data versus aggregated 
data (e.g. county level or province level). Structural variables account for differences in 
estimation methods. We include dummy variables for using multiple equation models versus 
single equation, for double log specification versus linear specification, for spatial 
econometrics versus ‘conventional’ procedures, and for including lagged dependent variables 
versus not using them. Finally, to account for differences in the quality of the study, we 
introduce a dummy accounting if the study is published in a reviewed journal or not.  
According to the estimation results in Table 5 the constant has a highly significant value of 
0.388. Hence, with some caution one could interpret this as average capitalisation elasticity 
over all types of agricultural support. A 1% change in support implies a 0.388% change in 
land prices. Based on our meta-analysis we cannot confirm a significant difference in 
capitalisation of market price support and direct payments compared to the reference 
category of total government payments. In contrast, decoupled direct payments seem to 
capitalise at a significantly higher rate into land values. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
agri-environmental payments are capitalised into land at a lower rate than the reference 
category of total government payments.  
Table 5. Estimation results of the meta-regression analysis 
Category Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Government 
payments 
Constant 0.388 *** 0.047 8.17 
Market price support 0.018  0.035 0.53 
Direct payments 0.058  0.064 0.92 
Decoupled direct payments 0.143 ** 0.063 2.28 
Agri-environmental payments -0.184 ** 0.071 -2.59 
Model 
variables 
Land rent -0.184 *** 0.031 -5.89 
Inclusion of non-agricultural variables -0.148 *** 0.033 -4.42 
Data variables 
Only arable plots considered 0.094 ** 0.038 2.45 
Farm level data -0.127 *** 0.040 -3.20 
Studies using European data 0.003  0.053 0.05 
Structural 
variables 
Multiple equation model 0.009  0.026 0.34 
Double log specification 0.021  0.034 0.60 
Spatial econometrics 0.205 *** 0.042 4.88 
Lagged dependent variable used -0.308 *** 0.043 -7.13 
Lagged independent variable used -0.090 ** 0.036 -2.49 
Informational 
variables 
Publication -0.027  0.031 -0.85 
 R-squared 0.616    
***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,10 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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In regard to the Z variables, the results show that taking theoretically consistent land rents 
(returns to land) to explain land values leads to lower elasticities of capitalisation. A similar 
effect occurs if non-agricultural variables are included in the estimations. Significantly higher 
capitalisation elasticities are observed for arable land and for aggregated data. In regard to 
estimation procedures we find significantly higher elasticities if spatial econometric models 
are utilised. In addition, the lag of the independent variable or the lag of the dependent 
variable had significant negative influences. Elasticities in published studies are not 
significantly different from those found in work that was not published.  
5. Discussion 
The purpose of this study is to give an overview of the theoretical foundations, empirical 
procedures and the derived results of the literature identifying the determinants of farmland 
prices.  
Almost all studies analysing the determinants of farmland prices either refer to the net 
present value (NPV) method or to the hedonic pricing approach as a basis of their work. The 
hedonic pricing approach is anchored in consumer utility theory and assumes that the 
observed prices of a good (in our case, land) are a function of a set of characteristics that 
define this good. Therefore, empirical models based on the hedonic pricing approach can 
include a multitude of very different explanatory variables, as long as those refer to a good’s 
characteristics. In contrast, the NPV model defines the maximum price somebody (in our 
case, a farmer) would be willing to pay for a particular asset (in our case, a piece of 
agricultural land) as the summed and discounted expected future stream of earnings from 
this asset. Using this as a starting point, we explained some of the developments and 
extensions of this model in regard to the NPV of land. Most important, future streams of 
earnings go beyond land rents and include rents from government policies. While the NPV 
approach gives a consistent theoretical explanation for the relationship between land prices 
and probably the most important influence factors – land rents and government payments – 
it also suffers several shortcomings if transferred to an estimable empirical model for land 
price determination. First, since expected future streams of earnings are not observable, one 
has to either make strong assumptions or the model is lacking theoretical consistency. 
Second, the NPV model does not explain what determines land prices beyond expected future 
earnings. We have discussed that in the econometric adoption of the NPV model additional 
explanatory variables can be introduced as shifters, comparable to the urban pressure 
indicators used in Goodwin et al. (2003). If those shift variables are included, the empirical 
model based on the NPV approach and the one based on the hedonic pricing approach 
converge. They are based on different theoretical considerations, but lead to the same 
econometric estimations.  
Section 3 discusses how empirical studies used a broad range of variables to explain land 
prices. We tried to systematise those variables by splitting them into six groups: three groups 
reflect earnings from land – variables directly or indirectly measuring land rents and 
variables measuring government payments – and three groups measure other influence 
factors – variables describing market structure, variables describing macroeconomic factors 
and variables describing pressure from non-agricultural land use. 
Finally, in section 4 we utilised a meta-regression analysis to investigate if different support 
policies reveal significantly different capitalisation rates. The results show that total 
government payments (not distinguishing different types) capitalise into land values with an 
elasticity of 0.388, with a 95% interval between 0.293 and 0.483. We are not able to find any 
significant difference in the capitalisation elasticity for market price support and direct 
payments compared to total payments. This seems reasonable (especially for market price 
support), given the importance of these two categories in total government payments. 
However, we find a significant higher capitalisation elasticity of additional 0.143 for 
decoupled direct payments. This is in line with theoretical considerations by Kilian et al. 
(2011), who argue that decoupled direct payments in the EU are strictly a subsidy on the 
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input factor land and hence increase land rents to a larger extent than market price support 
or animal payments. Results indicate a significantly lower capitalisation rate (-0.184) for 
agri-environmental payments compared to total payments. This seems reasonable given that 
agri-environmental payments often decrease land rents through decreased yields or 
increased input costs. 
Furthermore, the results show that taking theoretically consistent land rents (returns to land) 
to explain land values, rather than a proxy like market revenues, leads to lower elasticities 
(-0.184) of capitalisation in regard to government payments. Hence, taking a proxy 
significantly overestimates the capitalisation rate. The same is true for not including non-
agricultural variables accounting, for example, for urban pressure. Neglecting them results in 
a 0.148 percentage point higher capitalisation rate. In addition, we find a significant 
influence of the land type, the data type and estimation techniques on the capitalisation rate.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Selection of articles which estimate land price coefficients 
Article Research Design Main Results 
Government support not mentioned  
Traill, 1979 Study of the farm income effect (E.C. product price changes) on 
land values. Average annual price of land for England and Wales, 
farm income data for the UK, time span 1946 – 1978. 
1% increase in product prices would raise land prices by about 10% in the long 
run. Net farm income coeff.: 10.51, which is an equivalent to an elasticity of 
1.19 at the means of all variables.  
Melichar, 1979 Implements the annual growth rate of the current return into the 
capitalisation formula. 
If the annual growth rate is greater than zero the net present value of an asset 
rises, even though the rate itself and the discount rate applied to future 
returns remain unchanged. Net farm income is not an appropriate measure to 
explain farmland values. Reconsidering the variables expected capital gains 
and current yields on alternative investments.  
Castle and Hoch, 1982 National data of 1920 to 1978. Capital value of farm real estate includes the capitalised value of a stream of 
expected future increases (or decreases) in rent plus capital gains (or losses) 
not associated with service flows in agricultural production.  
Alston, 1986 Use of cash rents as a measure of income to land rather than 
residual income measure. 
Annual data for eight US states for the period 1963 to 1982 is 
used.  
Identifies real growth of rental income to land and the interaction of inflation 
and tax laws of the real growth of land prices in the 70s and 80s.  
The sum of the estimated weights on lagged capital gains: 1.54 (which is used 
as a coefficient of β). Negative effect of an increase in expected inflation on 
real land prices, although relatively small. 
Burt, 1986 Second-order rational distributed lag on net crop-share rents. 
Sample period 1960 – 1983. 
Capitalisation rate on rent = 4%. 
No significant effect of the expected rate of inflation and an exponential trend 
on rent expectations and land prices. 
Featherstone and 
Baker, 1988 
Use of cash rent and land price data of Tippecanoe County, 
Indiana, from 1960 through 1985. The crop returns data are 
estimates of the actual returns to land for corn and soybeans.  
Cash rent coeff.: 5.936 
Land value is a function of historical cash rents, while cash rents are a 
function of historical residual returns to land. 
Falk, 1991 Use of statistical techniques to study the relationship between 
financial asset prices and returns. 
Annual farmland price and rent data over 1921 to 1986.  
High correlation of farmland price and rent movements, but farmland price is 
more volatile. Failure of the net present value model. Farmland is 
characterised by rational bubbles and a time-varying discount rate could be 
favourable. Suggestion of non-traditional (or fad) models to explain farmland 
prices.  
Veeman et al., 1993 A dynamic model of demand for Canadian farmland is developed 
and applied to data for Canada and for the provinces Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario from 1961 to 1987.  
Total farm cash receipts are used as a proxy variable for the 
current economic returns from farm operations. 
Direct government payments account for 8.1% of total farm cash receipts 
from 1971 to 1990. The abolition of direct government transfer payments to 
farmers would reduce total farm cash receipts by 13.1% and would lead to a 
drop of land prices of 4.98% in the short run and by 18.47% in the long run. 
Cash receipt elasticity, short-run: 0.26 – 0.47 
Cash receipt elasticity, long-run: 0.92 – 1.52 
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Clark et al., 1993 Questions of capitalisation of farm subsidies into land values and 
if subsidies can simply be added to income from farm operations 
in explaining changes in land values. Annual, province-level 
observations from 1950 to 1987 on subsidies, income and land 
values in Saskatchewan, Canada. Subsidy data include direct and 
indirect payments.  
Subsidies as well as farm-generated income are capitalised into land values. 
Income by itself cannot support the secular growth in land values, income 
plus subsidies may.  
Hardie et al., 2001 County level farmland and residential housing values for 230 
counties in the Mid-Atlantic region. Farm returns, developed 
land values, household incomes, population densities, location as 
variables for 3 cross-sections of 1982, 1987 and 1992. 
Inelastic response of farmland prices to change in farm returns and more 
elastic response to nonfarm factors. Farm prices tend to increase 
systematically relative to house values as counties become more populous – 
diminishing elasticity of response of farmland price to house price. 
Mean revenue elasticity: 0.437 – 0.605 
Farm expenditure elasticity: 0.2 – 0.5 
Taylor and Brester, 
2005 
The study quantifies the impact of U.S. sugar policy on 
Montana’s irrigated cropland prices as an examination of 
noncash income transfer on agricultural land prices. The land 
transactions data include 569 observations on sales in 15 
counties between 1986 and 1999. The expected real annual price 
of sugar beets is used as a proxy for returns to land from sugar 
production.  
Capitalisation of the economic rents from noncash income transfer into land 
price 
Sugar beet price elasticity: 0.16 
Cash receipt elasticity: 0.10 
Sugar beet price plus sugar beet producing county elasticity: 0.32 
Statistically significant coefficient for population density.  
Government support as a coefficient 
Klinefelter, 1973 Annual Illinois average for each variable in the time period 1951 
– 1970. 
 
Government payments coeff.: -1.6937 
Estimation result against theory. Multicollinearity probably a reason. Strong 
positive correlation between land values and government payments. 
Vantreese et al., 1989 The influence of Burley tobacco quota is the centre of 
investigation. Data basis are individual agricultural land 
transactions over a thirteen-year period from 1973 to 1985 for 
twenty-nine counties across Kentucky, United States. Exclusion 
of observations with potential bias through hobby farming and 
urbanisation. Regression of parcel’s price on hedonic factors. Use 
of year dummy variables for the tobacco quota. 
The quota value as a percentage of average land value per acre is calculated 
after the estimation of capitalised values by year. According to the authors the 
capitalised value of quota per acre is between 12.1% and 38.9%. The tobacco 
quota values fluctuated 75% between some years. 
Runge and Halbach, 
1990 
Examination of the relative role of exports in determining 
expected net returns to farming over time as main objective. 
Observations in the grain region “Northwest Area” over the 
period 1949 to 1985. 
Direct government payments are the cash payments made to 
farmers complying with various provisions of farm program 
legislation. 
Domestic demand and foreign demand as explanatory variables have a 
positive and significant influence on land and building values in most states 
as well as direct government payments.  
Direct government elasticity: -0.056 to 0.404 over the period 1949 to 1985 
Domestic demand elasticity: 0.193 - 0.701 over the period 1949 to 1985 
Foreign demand elasticity: 0.260 – 0.484 over the period 1949 to 1985 
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Goodwin and Ortalo-
Magné, 1992 
Observation of the role of policy in determining agricultural land 
values in 6 important wheat-producing regions of Canada 
(Manitoba, Saskatchewan), US (Kansas, North Dakota) and 
France (Centre, Picardie). Government support for agricultural 
producers is measured through OECD PSE. Pooled data from 
1979 to 1989.  
PSE elasticity: 0.38, implicating that a 1% increase in PSEs corresponds to a 
0.38% increase in land prices. Expected yields and adjusted producer prices 
are also shown to significantly influence land values (elastic response, all 
elasticities between 1.02 and 1.19). 
Just and Miranowski, 
1993 
Cross-section/time-series data by state from 1963 to 1986. 
Research of the effects of naïve expectations of land prices, 
market returns and government payments, opportunity cost of 
capital, inflation etc.  
Government payments account for 15 to 25% of the capitalised value of land, 
but only for a small part of fluctuations. They do not change significantly from 
year-to-year, when they do, they only partially offset the change in market 
returns to farming.  
Large price swings are largely explained by inflation rates and changes in real 
returns on alternative uses of capital.  
Barnard et al., 1997 Two different regression-based approaches to address the 
question of how much impact government commodity programs 
currently have on the value of cropland via capitalisation of 
direct government payments.  
In the dataset, 1994 to 1996, county-level averages of the annual 
amount of direct government payments are used.  
Government payments elasticity: 0.12 – 0.69 (only those 8 states with a 
greater effect than 10%). Variables like population access and the presence of 
intensive crops have a significantly positive influence on land values.  
Weersink et al., 1999 Weersink allows the discount rates of the two income sources 
(farm production and government subsidies) to vary in a NPV 
model.  
Annual data from 1947 to 1993 of Ontario, Canada, on farmland 
prices, direct government subsidies and income from farm 
operations.  
Government payments are discounted less than are market based returns 
suggesting – government payments have been viewed as a more stable source 
of income than market-based returns.  
Subsidy elasticity, short-run: 0.009 
Subsidy elasticity, long-run: 0.625 
Production income, short-run: 0.062 
Production income, long-run: 0.433 
Duvivier et al., 2005 Effects of the 1992 and subsequent CAP reforms on arable 
farmland prices in Belgium are the centre of investigation. Use of 
a balanced panel of 42 Belgian districts for the period 1980 to 
2001. The sum of agricultural family income to account for 
market sales and the amount of support by hectare and the area 
of the crop (cereals, rapeseed, flax and fallow) to account for 
government support are used (instead of realised payment per 
hectare). The expectation approach is constructed through a four 
year average.  
Positive effect of the 1992 CAP on the arable farmland price in Belgium.  
Compensatory payment elasticity: 0.12 – 0.47 
The authors state that the sensitivity of arable farmland values to 
compensatory payments increases during the 1993-2001 period. The expected 
land rent from market sales has an important effect on arable farmland 
prices. The intervention price cut induced by the 1992 CAP reform decreases 
the rate of capitalisation of the expected land rent from market sales 
(decreasing elasticity from 0.24 to 0.18).  
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Devadoss and 
Manchu, 2007 
Use of county level cross-sectional and time-series data of the 
counties along the Snake River valley in Idaho, United States, 
covering the years from 1983 to 1997.  
Government payments and net farm income was obtained from 
the USDA and the farmland values from the Idaho State Tax 
commission.  
Government payments: 0.0058 (Model I, not sig.) and 0.0002 (Model II, not 
sig.) 
Net farm income: 0.01 (in both models) 
Net farm income, wheat yield, population and credit availability have positive 
effects on land values. Property tax rates, interest rates and debt to asset ratio 
have negative effects on land values. Demographic and macroeconomic 
variables are more important than the government subsidies.  
Weerahewa et al., 
2008 
Objective of determining the impact of changes in income from 
the market and government payments on farmland values.  
Use of provincial data from 1959 to 2004. Separation of this 
sample period into three general policy regimes (1959 – 1974, 
1975 – 1990 and 1991 – 2004).  
Farmland values seem to be disconnected from adjusted earnings per acre 
regardless of model specification. Positive influence of population density and 
negative influence of increases in real interest rates on land prices. 
Decoupling of government payments (introduction in 1991) appears to have 
had no negative effect on land values.  
Net farm income elasticity: 0.01 – 0.003 
Government payment elasticity: 0.02 – 0.06 
Shaik et al., 2010 
(improvement of 
Shaik, 2005; Shaik et 
al., 2006 and Shaik, 
2007) 
Use of an extended income capitalisation model to pay attention 
to counter-cyclical payments. U.S. state level data for 48 states in 
the period 1938 to 2006. 
On average 41.0-45.6% of farmland values can be identified with farm 
program payments and 54.4-59.0% with farm returns. Regional differences in 
capitalisation. 
Farm program payment elasticity: 0.103 – 0.875 depending on the resource 
region 
Farm program payment elasticity: 0.326 in the U.S. 
Predominantly separate modelling of government support measures 
Pyykkönen, 2005 National Land Survey (NLS) land price data of arms-length 
transfers of arable land from 1995 to 2002.  
Use of location on GIS coordinates for the creation of a weight 
matrix in the spatial lag specification. 
Average yield of barley on province level as a proxy for land 
quality (1995 – 2000). The support variables are on municipality 
level; only land-based support was included. 
Yield elasticity: 0.489 (2000 – 2002) - 0.547 (1995 – 1999) 
CAP elasticity: 0.212 (1995 – 1999) – 0.602 (2000 – 2002) 
LFA elasticity: 0.166 (1995 – 1999) – 0.835 (2000 – 2002) 
Results for environmental payments and national land-based support are not 
significant. CAP and LFA payments are similar and discounted at a lower rate 
than market income. CAP discount rates are lower in the 2000 – 2002 period 
compared to the 1995 – 1999 period.  
The author reports that ignoring spatial dependence leads to incorrect results. 
Influences on land prices are reported for land quality parameters, structural 
differences and structural change and infrastructure (other industries). 
Latruffe et al., 2008 Private transactions between 1995 – 2001 used as averages per 
district and per year. Average crop yields at the district level to 
proxy market-based returns. Assumption that effect of support is 
similar across districts and therefore national data is used.  
Strongest effect of direct payments (in this case area payments), compared to 
payments based on output and farm income. Higher capitalisation in pasture 
and gardens than in arable land. Capitalisation of government payments with 
a delay effect. No significant influence of population density and the average 
crop yield. 
Gov. paym. elasticity: 0.07 - 0.22 for arable land 
Gov. paym. elasticity: 0.10 – 0.89 for pasture 
Gov. paym. elasticity: 0.06 – 0.61 for gardens 
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Goodwin et al., 2010 
(improvement of 
Goodwin et al., 2003 
and Goodwin et al., 
2005)  
USDA NASS survey farm-level data of 1998 – 2005. Farmland 
values are estimated by farm operators. Favours expected 
payments (historical average values, preceding 5-years) instead 
of current payments – substantive differences in estimates. 
Market return coeff: 3.45 (5-year avg.) 
Total payments coeff: 13.13 (5-year avg.) 
Highest capitalisation of disaster payments and LDP, then direct payments 
and other payments and an important role of urban pressure. 
Kilian, 2010 A pooled OLS regression of actual transactions in Bavaria for odd 
years from 2001 to 2007 (model I) and a cross-section of 2007 
(model II) on cropland sales transactions. 
Direct payments: € 6.74 (model I) and € 29.77 (model II) 
Agri-env. payments: € -26.41 
LFA payments: € 3.43 (not significant) 
Influence of variables describing non-agricultural demand.  
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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